Newtonian Science, Miracles, and the Laws of Nature by Harrison, Peter
  University of Pennsylvania Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Journal of the 
History of Ideas.
http://www.jstor.org
University of Pennsylvania Press
Newtonian Science, Miracles, and the Laws of Nature 
Author(s): Peter Harrison 
Source:   Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 56, No. 4 (Oct., 1995), pp. 531-553
Published by:  University of Pennsylvania Press
Stable URL:  http://www.jstor.org/stable/2709991
Accessed: 30-10-2015 01:34 UTC
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/
 info/about/policies/terms.jsp
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content 
in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. 
For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
This content downloaded from 130.102.42.98 on Fri, 30 Oct 2015 01:34:15 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Newtonian Science, Miracles, 
and the Laws of Nature 
Peter Harrison 
Introduction 
"Newton," writes Richard Westfall, "both believed in and did not 
believe in miracles." It can only be concluded, Westfall continues, that the 
great scientist, unwilling to relinquish is belief in a providential nd inter- 
posing Deity, "abandoned himself to ambiguities and inconsistencies, which 
gave the appearance of divine participation i nature, but not the substance."' 
Newton's apparent ambivalence towards miracles highlights what to many 
commentators i one of the most curious features of seventeenth-century 
natural philosophy. Leading scientists of this era, almost without exception, 
had a dual commitment on the one hand to a science premised upon a 
mechanical universe governed by immutable laws of nature and on the other 
to a omnipotent God who intervened in the natural order from time to time, 
breaching these "laws" of nature.2 This puzzle is heightened by the fact that 
(in England at least) those figures who were at the forefront ofan advancing 
mechanical science were also the most staunch defenders of miracles.3 The 
Christian virtuosi of the Royal Society-Robert Boyle, Thomas Sprat, and 
John Wilkins, to take the most prominent examples-insisted not only that 
miracles could take place but that they played a vital role in establishing the 
truth of Christian religion.4 
1 Richard Westfall, Science and Religion in Seventeenth Century England (New 
Haven, 1970), 204. 
2 See, e.g., ibid., 5, 89; James Force, "The Breakdown of the the Newtonian Synthesis 
of Science and Religion," in Force and Richard Popkin (eds.), Essays on the Context, 
Nature, and Influence of Isaac Newton's Theology (Dordrecht, 1990). 
3 R. M. Burns, The Great Debate on Miracles from Joseph Glanvill to David Hume 
(London, 1981), 12. 
4 Boyle, The Christian Virtuoso in The Works, ed. Thomas Birch (6 vols.; Hildesheim, 
1966), V, 531; Thomas Sprat, The History of the Royal Society (London, 1667), 352; John 
Wilkins, Of the Principles and Duties of Natural Religion (London, 1675), 402. 
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It is now often assumed that such devout seventeenth-century scientists 
led strange dichotomous mental ives or, more charitably, that their felicitous 
reconciliation of scientific and religious pursuits was built upon a set of 
assumptions which only later, in light of arguments proposed by Hume and 
his successors, proved to be mutually conflicting. In this paper I hope to shed 
light upon one aspect of this puzzle by showing that Newton, along with his 
most prominent disciples, William Whiston and Samuel Clarke, came to 
understand miracles in a way quite different from their seventeenth-century 
predecessors, and that in developing this new conception of the miraculous 
they managed to avoid those conceptual confusions which are thought o 
afflict the cognitive worlds of their earlier contemporaries. The central 
feature of the Newtonians' position on this question concerns the definition 
of "miracle." As we shall see, the Newtonians rejected that standard efini- 
tion of miracle, according to which a miracle must involve a violation of laws 
of nature. Their alternative conception, significantly, could still serve the 
interests of Christian apologetics but without undermining the foundation 
upon which the scientific enterprise was constructed and without committing 
its adherents to the ambiguities and inconsistencies of which they are so often 
accused. 
Defining "Miracle" 
Modern discussions of miracles generally begin by defining a "miracle" 
as "a violation of the laws of nature." To this basic definition may be added 
the condition that the breach of the laws of nature occur as a result of the 
activity of God or some other supernatural gent; occasionally it is specified 
as a further equirement that the breach occur in order to confirm some 
religious doctrine or to establish the authority of some person.5 It has 
frequently been pointed out that, given such a definition, the very concept of 
"miracle" suffers from an inherent logical instability. Miracles, it seems, are 
parasitic upon the idea that there are laws of nature: without laws of nature, 
there can be no miracles; however, if there are miracles, this tends to destroy 
the very concept of a law of nature.6 For present purposes, the more interest- 
ing question to arise from this definition has to do with the conception of 
miracle which existed before the advent of modem science with its clearly 
formulated laws of nature. Miracles, in other words, have always had some 
apologetic function in Christian theology, a function which they exercised 
5 The classic statement of this definition appears in David Hume's "Of Miracles," An 
Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, ed. L. A. Selby Bigge (Oxford, 19753), X.I.90 
(1 14f.) For a more recent discussion of this definition see Richard Swinburne, The Concept 
of Miracle (London, 1970), ch. 3. 
6 See, e.g., Antony Flew, God and Philosophy (London, 1966), 148f. For a response to 
objections of this kind, see Miracles, ed. R. Swinburne (London, 1989), 9f, and Paul Dietl, 
"On Miracles," in Contemporary Philosophy of Religion, ed. Steven Cahn and David 
Shatz (Oxford, 1982), 146-53. 
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quite satisfactorily without recourse to a science committed to explanation in 
terms of laws of nature. Augustine, and after him Aquinas, helped shape a 
premodern conception of miracles, a conception which did not and indeed 
could not involve reference to laws of nature but which came to be directly 
relevant o the Newtonian redefinition of "miracle." 
Augustine was actually the first to attempt a formal definition of 
"miracle."7 A miracle, he wrote in a letter to his Manichaean friend Hon- 
oratus, is "anything which appears arduous or unusual, beyond the expecta- 
tion or ability of the one who marvels at it."8 Such marvellous events, he was 
to say elsewhere, are not "contrary to nature" but rather "contrary to our 
knowledge of nature."9 Ignorance of the causes of an event, however, was a 
necessary but insufficient mark of the miraculous. For Augustine all the 
phenomena of nature-"the changes of day and night, the very constant order 
of heavenly bodies, the fourfold change of the seasons"-were in a sense 
miraculous. But they were not regarded as such because they are part of our 
constant experience.10 In Augustine's rather subjective view of miracles, 
then, a miracle had to have an unknown cause and it had to be unusual. Yet 
there was no intrinsic difference between the miraculous and the mun- 
dane-miracles were distinguished only by their effect on observers. 
Aquinas was concerned to arrive at a more precise definition, one which 
located the essence of miracle in the event and not in the observer. He did this 
by yoking the religious sense of miracle to the Aristotelian doctrine of the 
intrinsic "qualities" or "powers" of substances. While agreeing with Au- 
gustine that a miracle is not contrary to nature, Aquinas argued that a miracle 
was nonetheless "apart from the order implanted in things."11 Itfollows that 
miracles invoke wonder (Augustine's definition) because their cause defies 
explanation in terms of the natural properties of the objects involved: an 
event is a miracle if "we observe the effect but do not know its cause." 12 
Aquinas further clarified his position by specifying three classes of event 
which seem to fit this description and yet are not genuine miracles. First are 
events the causes of which are known to some but not others. An eclipse of 
the sun, for example, is not miraculous because although most men are 
ignorant of its cause, the astronomer isnot. A miracle can only be something 
that has "a completely hidden cause in an unqualified way ... not simply in 
7 For a brief history of conceptions of the miraculous see John A. Hardon, "The 
Concept of Miracle from St. Augustine to Modern Apologetics," Theological Studies, 15 
(1954), 229-57. Specifically on Augustine, see R. M. Grant, Miracle and Natural Law in 
Graeco-Roman and Early Christian Thought (Amsterdam, 1952), 215-20. 
8 De utilitate credendi, 16.34, in The Fathers of the Church, IV (New York, 1947), 
437. 
9 Augustine, De civitate dei, XXI.8; Contra Faustum, XXVI.3 (my emphasis). 
10 De civitate dei, XVI.34; cf. Cicero, De divinatione, ii, 49. 
11 Aquinas, Summa contra gentiles, tr. Vernon Bourke (New York, 1955-57), III, 
100.1. 
12 Ibid., III, 101.1. 
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relation to one person or another: it must have a cause hidden from every 
man."-13 A second class of non-miraculous event which seems to fit the 
description concerns the operation of occult qualities. Aquinas gave two 
stock examples here-the magnet which attracts iron and the small fish (the 
Echeneis) which was thought o be able to impede the passage of large ships. 
Although the causes of these observed phenomena re unknown, Aquinas 
states that the effect of such objects are "limited to some definite ffect."14 In
other words the effects are repeatable and to some extent predictable. There- 
fore, while the cause is hidden, or occult, the effect is not miraculous. Finally, 
certain remarkable vents have causes unknown to us because they are 
performed by superior beings-angels or demons. These are not true miracles 
because it is within the created power of these free agents to perform these 
acts. Just as it is within the power of a human agent to throw a stone up into 
the air, causing it to act "unnaturally," so invisible agents can bring about 
unusual effects even though they do not act above their created natures. Of 
these events Aquinas says: 
now since the entire power of created nature is unknown to us, when 
anything occurs outside the usual run of things through some power 
unknown to us, we assume that it is miraculous [est miraculum quod 
nos]. So when the demons do something by their own natural power, 
we say that this is a miracle not in the strict sense, but relatively to 
us.15 
Aquinas thus provides a clear account of what a genuine miracle is but at 
the same time concedes that an observer, relying on unaided reason, may not 
be able to distinguish the genuine from the "relative" miracle. In other 
words Aquinas's definition enables us to specify the formal conditions for a 
true miracle even though in practice we might not be in a position to know 
whether any given event meets those conditions: it is always possible that an 
unusual event has causes which are natural (i.e., not beyond the created 
powers of things) and yet unknown. 
With the onset of the scientific revolution, the standard Thomist account 
of miracles became inadequate for two reasons. First, the Aristotelian doc- 
trine that individual substances had inherent powers was abandoned. In the 
new philosophy, natural objects were stripped of those natural qualities 
which had hitherto provided the basis of causal explanations of their activi- 
ties. Scientific accounts of events were no longer couched in terms of the 
formal and material causes or the created powers of the objects involved. 
Now explanations relied upon externally-acting efficient causes. The regular 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid., III.102.3. 
15 Summa theologiae (London, 1964-76), la.110, 4. (XV, 17) (my emphasis). Cf. 
Summa contra gentiles, III, 102. 
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operations of these secondary causes were described in laws of nature. In the 
new mechanical world order miracles came to be understood as violations or 
suspensions of these laws. Robert Boyle, for example, wrote that while God 
established laws of nature, "yet he has not bound up his own hands by them, 
but can invigorate, suspend, overrule, and reverse any of them as he thinks 
fit."'-6 John Wilkins, one of the founders of the Royal Society, agreed that a 
miracle was a "violation" or "disordering" of "the universal Laws of 
Nature.""7 Thomas Sprat, first historian of the Royal Society, spoke simi- 
larly of God's prerogative to "change the wonted Laws of the Creation."'8 
This understanding ofmiracle njoyed wide acceptance in both scientific and 
theological circles.'9 From this modem conception it followed that, barring 
God's intervention or "interposition," everything which took place in the 
world could be accounted for in terms of regular secondary causes. Thus, 
while God was the ultimate cause of all things, he was the immediate cause 
only of the miraculous. All his other works were brought about through the 
operation of secondary causes.20 
It was not only the scientific revolution which highlighted the inad- 
equacy of the Thomist account of miracles. Changes in the very conception 
of "religion" meant that now miracles were to play a vital role in the 
confirmation fthose doctrines presumed to constitute the essence of Christi- 
anity. The two centuries following the Protestant Reformation witnessed a
remarkable shift in emphasis from faith to knowledge. Increasingly Christi- 
anity was thought o be about assenting to certain revealed propositions 
which together constituted "saving knowledge." Miracles, along with ful- 
filled prophecies, came to be the most important criterion by which the 
authenticity ofputative revelations could be assessed. It is for this reason that 
apologetic arguments based on miracles became prominent during the early 
modern period.2' Again, Robert Boyle is typical. The evidence of miracles, 
he argued, "is little less than absolutely necessary to evince ... that the 
16 Boyle Manuscripts, Royal Society, London, VII, fols. 113-14, cited by Burns, The 
Great Debate, 54. Cf. Boyle, A Disquisition about the Final Causes of Natural Things 
(London, 1688), 96. 
17 Wilkins, Principles and Duties of Natural Religion, 402. 
18 Sprat, History of the Royal Society, 357. 
19 For theological uses of this definition see, e.g., Robert Jenkin, The Reasonableness 
and Certainty of the Christian Religion (London, 1698), 34; Thomas Browne, Miracles 
Work's Above and Contrary to Nature (London, 1683); Edward Stillingfleet, Origines 
Sacrae (Cambridge, 17027), 170. 
20 Boyle, A Free Inquiry into the Vulgarly received Notion of Nature, Works, V, 252f.; 
The Christian Virtuoso, Works, V, 532. 
21 Admittedly, miracles and prophecy had in the past been exploited as arguments in 
favor of the Christian revelation. See Aquinas, Summa theologica, 1 a2ae. 111, 4. However, 
in no previous period of history had they achieved the prominence which they were to enjoy 
in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. See Bums, The Great Debate, 12. 
The use of miracles as evidences, moreover, is typically Protestant. Catholic discussions of 
miracles are as much about criteria for canonization. 
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Christian [religion] does really proceed from God."22 But if miracles were to 
perform this apologetic function, there had to be clear criteria which distin- 
guished them from the merely remarkable-from Aquinas's "relative 
miracles"-as well as from the spurious miracles of Catholics and enthusi- 
asts.23 On the understanding that miracles were violations of the laws of 
nature, it followed that those most familiar with these laws would be best 
placed to judge whether any given event warranted the label "miracle." 
Aquinas, while subscribing to a different conception of scientific explana- 
tion, had already argued for the special expertise of the scientist in the 
discernment of true miracles. 
This view was to be vigorously restated in seventeenth-century England 
by the virtuosi of the Royal Society. Robert Boyle was thus to argue that the 
practitioner of the new philosophy "will examine with more strictness and 
skill, than ordinary men are able, miracles, prophecies, or other proofs, said 
to be supernatural, that are alleged to evince a real religion" and so discern 
"the certain and genuine characters of truth."24 Sprat endorsed Boyle's view, 
arguing for the unique competence of the experimental philosopher: 
He cannot suddenly conclude all extraordinary events to be the 
immediat Finger of God, because he familiarly beholds the inward 
working of things, and thence perceives that many effects, which use 
to affright the Ignorant, are brought forth by the common Instru- 
ments of Nature.25 
So it was that the leading advocates of the mechanical philosophy in England 
specified clear formal conditions for the occurrence of miracles and, equally 
importantly, made the unprecedented claim that they could ascertain when 
these conditions had been satisfied. Both religious and scientific thinkers in 
mid-seventeenth-century England seemed to be adequately served by this 
conception of miracle, remaining blissfully unaware of what to later com- 
mentators was a glaring inconsistency in their approach. Boyle and those of 
his fellow scientists who vociferously advocated the apologetic use of 
miracles saw only the positive features of their approach-that once the 
22 Boyle, The Christian Virtuoso, Works, V, 531. Cf. Sprat, History of the Royal 
Society, 352; John Wilkins, Principles and Duties of Natural Religion, 402. 
23 This remained a problem for moderate proponents of the argument from miracles. 
Stillingfleet, for example, while favouring the argument from miracles, despaired that 
"there be no certain cprlpua or notes of difference, whereby to know Divine Miracles from 
Delusions .." (Origines Sacrae, 225). 
4 Boyle, The Christian Virtuoso, Works, V, 538, 531. 
25 Sprat, History of the Royal Society, 358f. Cf. Anon, A Short Discourse concerning 
Miracles (London, 1702), 26f; Robert Filmer, An Advertisement tothe Jurymen of England 
touching Witches (London, 1688), 8; John Gaule, Select Cases of Conscience touching 
Witches (London, 1646), 98; Francis Bacon, The Advancement of Learning and New 
Atlantis, ed. Arthur Johnston, (Oxford, 1974), 222. 
This content downloaded from 130.102.42.98 on Fri, 30 Oct 2015 01:34:15 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Newtonian Science 537 
immutable laws of nature had been uncovered there would be no doubt what 
sorts of events would be miraculous. Their blindness to the apparent logical 
instability of the concept is what has led contemporary commentators to 
speak of the "absolute contradiction" in their thought.26 The Newtonians 
who followed them, particularly Richard Bentley, Whiston, Clarke, and even 
Newton himself, were far more aware of the difficulties in reconciling a
mechanistic world with an interposing God. Yet they too were to find a place 
in their scientific world for miracles. 
The Newtonian Conception of "Miracle" 
In the inaugural series of Boyle Lectures held in the years 1691-92 
Richard Bentley had proposed a new argument for the existence of a provi- 
dential God. Here he announced that "all the powers of mechanism are 
dependent on the Deity," for "gravity, the great basis of all mechanism, is 
not itself mechanical, but the immediate fiat and finger of God, and the 
execution of divine law."27 William Whiston took up Bentley's cue and 
argued similarly that gravity depended upon "the constant and efficacious, 
and, if you will, the supernatural nd miraculous Influence of Almighty 
God."28 Samuel Clarke likewise insisted that "all those things which we 
commonly say are the Effects of the Natural Powers of Matter, and Laws of 
Motion; of Gravitation, Attraction, or the like; are indeed ... the Effects of 
God's acting upon Matter continually and every moment."29 Even Newton 
was reported as having observed "that a continual miracle is needed to 
prevent he Sun and the fixed stars from rushing together through gravity."30 
For the Newtonians, then, it followed that a conception of miracle which 
relied upon God's interposition orthe operation of his immediate power was 
unavailable, for the mundane operation of gravity fell under that description. 
If the operation of gravity was, as Whiston indicated, a supernatural nd 
miraculous occurrence in terms of the prevailing definition, then a new 
understanding ofmiracle was required, for without such a definition, gravita- 
tion, and the whole mechanical system it supported, would be deemed 
miraculous. To Samuel Clarke, that redoubtable apologist for Newtonian 
26 Westfall, Science and Religion, 89. 
27 Richard Bentley, Boyle Lectures, Sermon IV, in The Works of Richard Bentley, 
D.D., ed. Alexander Dyce (London, 18386), III, 74, 75. Cf. Sermon VI, Works, III, 163f. 
God's active presence was required in the mutual attraction of bodies in order to shield 
Newton from the charge of reviving either occult qualities (of which Leibniz accused him) 
or atheistic Epicureanism. See Newton's correspondence with Bentley, in Works of Rich- 
ard Bentley, III, 21 if.; cf. The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence, ed. H. G. Alexander, 
(Manchester, 1976), 92. 
28 William Whiston, A New Theory of the Earth (London, 1696), 218. 
29 Samuel Clarke, The Evidences of Natural and Revealed Religion, in The Works of 
Samuel Clarke, D.D. (2 vols.; London, 1738), II, 697, cf. 601. 
30 Memoranda by David Gregory (1694), The Correspondence of Isaac Newton, ed. H. 
W. Turnbull et al. (7 vols.; Cambridge, 1959-77), III, 336. 
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science, fell the task of redefining "miracle" in such a way as to exclude 
such mundane operations of God's immediate power as gravity, and yet to 
maintain some continuity with the traditional sense of miracle and its apolo- 
getic role. 
To retain the historical sense of "miracle," Clarke revived the Augustin- 
ian notion that the key feature of a miracle is its unusualness. This under- 
standing of miracles was developed in both the Boyle Lectures of 1704-5 and 
in the celebrated correspondence with Leibniz. In the former he argues that 
absolutely speaking, in This strict and Philosophical Sense; either 
nothing is miraculous, namely, if we have respect to the Power of 
God; or, if we regard our own Power and Understanding, then almost 
every thing, as well what we call natural, as what we call supernatu- 
ral, is in this Sense really miraculous; and 'tis only usualness or 
Unusualness that makes the distinction. 
There is, Clarke asserts, "no such thing, as what Men commonly call the 
course of Nature, or the Power of Nature...." He concludes: "'Tis not 
therefore a right Distinction; to define a Miracle to be That which is against 
the Course of Nature."31 
It is worth mentioning at this stage that in addition to this "philosophi- 
cal" definition, Clarke also offered a "theological definition" in which he 
appears to return to the traditional conception of the interposition of God.32 
Commentators have usually taken this to mean that in the final analysis, 
Clarke takes a traditional view of miracles. What seems more likely is that 
Clarke holds that the same event may admit both philosophical and theologi- 
cal explanations-the former dealing with causes, the latter with purposes. 
How these two definitions of miracle might consistently be held is an issue to 
which we shall return. For the moment let us note that in the protracted 
controversy with Leibniz, in which a significant proportion of the discussion 
was given over to the notion of miracle, Clarke's whole case is based upon 
the philosophical understanding of miracle. "Natural" and "supernatural," 
he again insists, are "distinctions merely in our conceptions of things."33 A
miracle, he later points out, "does not consist in any difficulty inthe nature 
of the thing to be done, but merely in the unusualness of God's doing it."34 
31 Clarke, Evidences of Natural and Revealed Religion, Works, II, 697f. Cf. Leibniz- 
Clarke Correspondence, 114; and Sermon CLVIII, "Of the Duty of Prayer," Works, II, 
281. 
21 "[T]he true Definition of a Miracle, in the Theological Sense of the Word, is this; 
that it is work effected in a manner Unusual, or different from the common and regular 
Method of Providence, by the interposition either of God himself, or of some Intelligent 
Agent superiour to Man, for the Proof or Evidence of some particular Doctrine, or in 
attestation to the Authority of some particular person" (Evidences of Natural and Revealed 
Religion, Works, II, 701). 
33 Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence, 24, 29, 35, 42. 
34 Ibid., 114. 
This content downloaded from 130.102.42.98 on Fri, 30 Oct 2015 01:34:15 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Newtonian Science 539 
Leibniz was to respond that Clarke's definition of miracle differed from the 
"received notion" and would prove unacceptable to both divines and philoso- 
phers. If miraculous events were distinguished from the mundane merely by 
the subjective criteria proposed by Clarke, then, concluded Leibniz, "there 
will be no internal real difference, between a miracle and what is natural, and 
at the bottom, every thing will be either equally natural, or equally miracu- 
lous."35 As it turned out, this implication had already been anticipated by 
Clarke, Whiston, and Newton as well. 
Whiston agreed with Clarke that what constitutes a miracle is a function 
of our knowledge of causes, and the same event may thus be both miraculous 
and natural depending upon the state of knowledge of the observer. "Al- 
mighty God," he says, "has so constituted the World that no Body can tell 
wherein it differs from one, where all were solely brought o pass by a 
miraculous Power."36 This also seems to have been the view of Newton. In a 
short unpublished note Newton wrote, 
[M]iracles are so called not because they are the works of God but 
because they happen seldom and for that reason create wonder. If 
they should happen constantly according to certain laws impressed 
upon the nature of things, they would be no longer wonders of 
miracles but would be considered in philosophy as part of the phe- 
nomena of nature notwithstanding that the cause of their causes 
might be unknown toUS.37 
Armed with this conception of miracles, the Newtonians and a number of 
their fellow travellers went on to show that many miracles, in particular those 
recorded in the Old Testament, were merely "relative." In one way or 
another the marvellous events set down by Moses in the Pentateuch could be 
demonstrated tofall within the mechanistic order of nature. Thomas Burnet, 
for example, set out a naturalistic account of the Old Testament Deluge in 
Telluris Theoria Sacra (1681).38 In this work he set out a "first Rule con- 
35 Ibid., 91. 
36 Whiston, New Theory, 219. 
37 Cited in Westfall, Science and Religion, 203f. Similar conceptions of miracle were 
espoused by Nehemiah Grew and John Locke. Grew thought that "Nature it self is a 
Standing Miracle, the Operations whereof, we should as much wonder at, as any Miracle, if 
we did not see them every day." Cosmologia Sacra: or, a Discourse of the Universe as it is 
the Creature and Kingdom of God (London, 1701), 195, 316. In his Discourse of Miracles 
(1706), Locke described miracles as events which were "above the comprehension of the 
spectator, and in his opinion contrary to the established course of nature" and which are, 
"taken by him to be divine" (Works [London, 180110], IX, 256, my emphasis). For 
contemporary discussion of these definitions ee William Fleetwood, An Essay upon 
Miracles. In Two Discourses (London, 1701), 2, 139; Anon., A Short Discourse, 3f. and 
passim; Samuel Chandler, A Vindication of the Christian Religion (London, 1725), 7-10. 
38 English tr., The Theory of the Earth ... the First Two Books (London, 16912); cf. 
Correspondence of Isaac Newton, II, 319-34. 
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cerning miracles"-"That we must not flie to miracles, where Man and 
nature are sufficient."39 The Mosaic account, he insisted, "bears in it the 
evident marks of an accommodation to the vulgar notions concerning the 
form of the World." Stripped of these marks of accommodation, the Genesis 
account of the world's origins meshed quite neatly with his own scientific 
account of the Creation. William Whiston adopted the same principle in his 
New Theory of the Earth (1696). Numerous events recorded in sacred history, 
while presumed to result from miraculous interventions, were not in fact 
against the ordinary course of nature: 
For those Events or Actions are in Holy Scripture attributed immedi- 
ately to the Power of Providence of God, which yet were to all 
outward appearance according to the constant course of things, and 
would, abstracted from such Affirmation of the Holy Books, have 
been esteem'd no more miraculous than the other common Effects of 
Nature, or usual Accidents of Humane Affairs.40 
This, Whiston, later observes, is "the Secret of Divine Providence in the 
Government of the World, whereby the Rewards and Punishments of God's 
mercy and Justice are distributed to his Rational Creatures without any 
disturbance of the setled Course of Nature, or a miraculous interposition on 
every occasion."41 Whiston restated his view in Astronomical Principles of 
Religion, Natural and Reveal'd (1717), where he again asks whether "ex- 
traordinary and miraculous Cases" might not take place "without he direct 
Alteration of those fixed and Constant Laws of Nature." Here he provides 
further examples of apparent miracles which admit of naturalistic explana- 
tions.42 
The Cosmologia Sacra (1701) of Nehemiah Grew (the stated purpose of 
which was, ironically, to refute the hermeneutical principles of Spinoza) 
proposed similar explanations of Old Testament miracles. The plagues of 
Egypt, to use but one of Grew's examples, were all brought about by "sundry 
Natural Causes." Moses' turning of the river to blood was effected when the 
unfortunate aquatic inhabitants of the Nile simultaneously contracted a rather 
unpleasant gastric omplaint: "all the Fish, small and great, with the Hippo- 
potamus, Crocadile, and other Amphibious Creatures were seiz'd with a 
Dysenterick Murrain."43 It was the combined effluvia of this indisposed 
menagerie which changed the waters of the great river to blood. 
39 Thomas Bumet, The Theory of the Earth ... the Last Two Books (London, 1691), III, 
ch. viii. 
40 Whiston, New Theory, 218f. 
41 Ibid., 359. Cf. John Donne, Essayes in Divinity (Oxford, 1952), 81-84. 
42 Whiston, Astronomical Principles of Religion, Natural and Reveal'd (London, 
1717), 127f. 
43 Grew, Cosmologia Sacra, 196f. 
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Not surprisingly, critics of such accounts complained that the introduc- 
tion of mechanical philosophy into hermeneutics not only did violence to the 
literal sense of Scripture, but did away with the traditional meanings of 
"ordinary" and "extraordinary providence," and "miracle."44 This in turn 
threatened the whole apologetic enterprise which looked to miracles to 
validate the claims of the Christian revelation. If miracles were not different 
in a philosophical sense, from mundane events, and if the labels "natural" 
and "supernatural" amounted to the same thing, as Clarke adamantly in- 
sisted, then "miraculous" events could not be enlisted as support for the 
Christian revelation.45 
Miracles as Evidence 
The standard use of miracles in the seventeenth-century apologetics was 
not quite as straightforward as critics have sometimes assumed.46 Miracles 
were most usually used as proofs in conjunction with a number of other 
arguments. The basic tenets of natural religion-the existence of God, the 
immortality of the soul and so on-could be established by rational argu- 
ments (sometimes referred to as "internal evidences"). However, doctrines 
specific to Christianity, such as Incarnation and Trinity, were "beyond" or 
"above" reason, and their truth could not be directly proved. The truth of 
these doctrines then, became dependent upon the authority of those who 
promulgated them. The argument from miracles was essentially that the 
doctrines taught by Christ and his disciples were true because they were 
accompanied by the working of miracles. Since miracles were superna- 
tural-beyond or against nature-they could only be direct activities of God, 
wrought in order to signify the divine origin of the message being preached. 
Traditionally, miracles were yoked to prophecies which also functioned as 
"external evidences," the two lending mutual support o each other.47 The 
" See, e.g., John Keill, An Examination of the Reflections on The Theory of the Earth 
together with a Defence of the Remarks on Mr. Whiston's New Theory (Oxford, 1699), 1 If. 
and passim; John Edwards, Brief Remarks upon Mr. Whiston's New Theory of the Earth 
(London, 1697), 27-30 and passim; John Beaumont, Considerations of a Book, Entituled 
The Theory of the Earth (London, 1693), 44; William Nicholls, Conference with a Theist, 
Part II (London, 1697), 193-209; Cf. Whiston, A Vindication of the New Theory of the Earth 
(London, 1698), 30. Keill, incidentally, was himself a Newtonian, albeit one who clearly 
subscribed to the traditional understanding of miracles. 
45 This dilemma has been succinctly expressed more recently by Alastair McKinnon, 
"'Miracle' and 'Paradox,'" American Philosophical Quarterly, 4 (1967), 309. Here he 
argues that when the term "miracle" is used "expressively" (to express wonder) and not 
"descriptively" (to describe a violation), it is difficult o see how it retains any religious 
force. Cf. Flew, God and Philosophy, 148. 
46 For a guide to the standard arguments, ee Burns, The Great Debate, chs. 3 and 5. 
47 The fulfillment of a prophecy demonstrated the divine origin of the prophetic 
message, since only God has certain knowledge of future contingents. For typical state- 
ments of the dual argument see Robert Jenkin, Reasonableness and Certainty of the 
Christian Religion, 29-42; Stillingfleet, Origines Sacrae, Bk. II, chs. viii, ix. Jenkin 
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context and tendency of miracles provided important indications of their 
authenticity. Miracles needed to be wrought in support of a message, and the 
message had to be consonant with natural knowledge of divine truths.48 For 
miracles to function as proofs, the hearts of the observers had to be 
receptive-as Chancellor Bacon had put it, "There was never a miracle 
wrought by God to convert an atheist."49 The performance of miracles, 
moreover, had a cumulative ffect: a number of miracles performed by the 
same person was a more convincing display of divine power than a single 
miracle.50 Finally, miracles, despite the immoderate claims of their more 
vocal advocates, constituted only a "moral" proof-a proof which possessed 
less than mathematical certainty, but to which unprejudiced men of reason 
would assent."1 
Despite these important qualifications and safeguards, however, the basic 
argument still required miracles to be violations of natural aws. On the face 
of it, miracles in the Newtonian sense could not be substituted into these 
traditional rguments (as critics of the mechanistic theories of the earth had 
already pointed out). It is surprising, then, that those within the Newtonian 
clique and Clarke in particular still seemed to want to retain some apologetic 
role for miracles. Clarke firmly insisted that the Christian revelation is 
"positively and directly proved to be actually and immediately sent to us 
from God" on account of miracles, fulfilled prophecies, and the testimony of 
Jesus' disciples.52 Either Clarke was dissembling, or he was using the argu- 
ment from miracles in quite a new way. In a sense he was actually doing both, 
as we shall see. For the moment, let us turn our attention to the way in which 
both Clarke and Whiston developed novel strategies which enabled them to 
retain an apologetic use for those events commonly thought o be miracles. 
First, they were able to put forward an indirect proof of the Christian 
revelation as contained in scripture, by actually inverting the standard argu- 
ment from miracles. Spinoza, along with a number of the English "deists," 
had asserted that miracles are a priori mpossible. It followed that miracle 
narratives in scripture were not to be read literally and, if taken seriously at 
all, were to be interpreted in a "figurative" sense."3 The upshot was that 
actually notes that miracles alone are not a sufficient estimony to a doctrine: "Though 
miracles are a most fit and proper Means to prove the Truth of Religion; yet they are not 
only to be consider'd alone, but in conjunction with other Proofs" (43). 
48 Ibid., 42. Cf. Augustine, De utilitate credendi, 16.34. 
"1 Francis Bacon, Advancement of Learning, II.vi.1 (86). Cf. Boyle, The Religious 
Virtuoso, Works, V, 514, 524. Bentley, Boyle Lectures, 6th ed., Sermon VI, in Works, III, 
125; Aquinas, Summa theologica, 2a2ae. 6, 1 (XXXI, 167). 
50 See Locke, A Discourse of Miracles, Works, IX, 259 
51 On "moral certainty," see Wilkins, Principles and Duties of Natural Religion, 7-10, 
88-93, and Clarke, Works, II, 600. 
52 Clarke, Evidences of Natural and Revealed Religion, Works, II, 697. 
53 Thus Charles Blount: "For in Scripture many things are related as real, and which 
were also believ'd to be real even by the Relators themselves; that notwithstanding were 
only Representations form'd in the Brain, and meerly imaginary" (Miracles no Violations 
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Scripture, as a supposed record of divine revelation, was unreliable. The 
Newtonians responded by arguing that many of the remarkable vents re- 
corded in the Old Testament were consonant with the new science, and indeed 
were the most likely scientific explanations of certain features of the world. As 
we have already seen, such events as the Creation, the Flood, and the plagues 
of Egypt were used by the Newtonians to show that the details of sacred 
history were compatible with the new philosophy. But more than this, the 
reliability of Scripture as a whole was vindicated by demonstrating that 
narratives which on the face of it were highly implausible, were actually 
confirmed by a mechanical science. As Whiston put it: 
So certainly the Establishment of the Verity of the Scriptures in the 
most harsh and difficult Assertions touching the Natural World (the 
proper Case in which the improvement of Philosophy was likely to 
afford means for our Determination) ought to assure us of the like 
verity of the same Scripture in the other Points, more peculiarly the 
Subjects of Divine Revelation, less capable of affording any other 
means of Satisfaction.54 
Clarke articulated the same argument, declaring that in the Christian scrip- 
tures alone is found a scientifically reliable account of the world's origins. 
"AMONG the writings of all, even the most ancient and learned Nations," 
he wrote, "there are None but the books of the Jews, which [have] ... given 
any tolerable account in particular, of the Formation of this our earth into its 
present habitable State."55 Thus, despite cutting the ground from beneath the 
traditional argument from miracles, scientific endorsement of miracle ac- 
counts functioned like the other external evidences by attesting to the general 
authority of the source of a putative revelation. 
A second apologetic argument proposed by the Newtonians was that, 
despite the fact that the causes of some "miracles" might be known, the 
timing and combination of various natural causes revealed the hand of God: 
some events are miraculous because they involve remarkable coincidences 
which can be given plausible religious interpretations. Thus, even granting 
that "miracles" are no different from other events in terms of the causation, 
the synchronization fthese unusual events with the course of human history 
testified to the prescience and providential plan of God. For example, even 
though the natural causes of the Deluge, the plagues of Egypt, and the parting 
of the Laws of Nature [London, 1683], 23). Blount's work, as Thomas Browne tactlessly 
pointed out, was plagiarized from Spinoza and others. Browne, Miracles Work's Above and 
Contrary to Nature, 1-3. Cf. Spinoza, Tractatus theologico-politicus, in Works (2 vols.; 
London, 18892), 1, 84, 92-94; John Toland, Tetradymus (London, 1720). Also see the 
arguments of "Philologus" in Nicholls, Conference with a Theist, Part II. 
54 Whiston, New Theory, 381f. Cf. Burnet's preface to The Theory of the Earth, Books 
I and II (London, 16973). 
55 Clarke, Evidences of Natural and Revealed Religion, Works II, 705. 
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of the Red Sea could be enumerated, itwas the fact that they were unusual, 
and had occurred precisely when they did, which made them miraculous. 
Why did creatures of the Nile contract heir distemper at such an opportune 
time? Why did the Flood coincide with the growth of human wickedness? 
Why did the Red Sea part for the Israelites and then inundate their Egyptian 
pursuers? The answers to these questions could not be found solely in the 
examination of nature but required reference to God's purposes, or to the 
"moral order of the world." In Whiston's words, "the coincidence of things 
from first o last, through so many stages and periods of Nature" is what is 
remarkable and "miraculous."56 And in the timing of these coincidences is to 
be found the reason why such "miracles" might function as evidences. God, 
says Whiston, "so previously adjusted and contemper'd the Moral and 
Natural World to one another, that the Marks and Tokens of his Providence 
should be in all Ages legible and conspicuous, whatsoever the visible second- 
ary Causes or Occasions might be... ."5 Thus the events of history, whether 
we wish to style certain of them "providential" or "miraculous," all tend to 
the same end. 
Future divine "interventions" prophesied in scripture could sustain a 
similar analysis. Burnet's conjectures regarding the final conflagration of the 
world are a clear example. Burnet considered a range of possibilities as to 
how this conflagration might be brought about-the earth's orbit approach- 
ing too close to the sun or the erruption of the earth's central fire-before 
concluding that the conflagration would be caused by a combination of 
volcanoes, flammable materials in the earth's core, and fiery meteors."8 Yet 
despite this scientific explanation, God's hand was visible in the timing of 
the event: "and tho' the Causes may be sufficient when all united, yet the 
union of them at such a time, and in such a manner, I look upon as the effect 
of a particular Providence."59 
It is hard to overemphasize the significance of this account of miraculous 
events. By deleting all reference to breaches of laws of nature and by locating 
the essence of the miraculous in the concatenation of natural causes, miracle 
accounts could become immune to the standard criticisms which have be- 
come familiar to us since Hume's "Of Miracles."60 Moreover, such a con- 
ception allows for a far more durable synthesis of science and religion than 
had been possible with the conception of nature promoted by Boyle and 
others. "Coincidence miracles" enable both scientific and theological de- 
scriptions to apply to the same event without competing with each other. 
Miracles and laws of nature could now peacefully coexist. 
56 Whiston, New Theory, 103 (my emphasis). Cf. Grew, Cosmologia Sacra, 200. 
57 Whiston, New Theory, 219 (my emphasis). 
58 The Theory of the Earth, bk. III, chs. vi, vii. 
59 Burnet, The Theory of the Earth ... the Last Two Books, bk. III, ch. iv. 
60 The notion of a "coincidence" miracle has been rehabilitated in the twentieth 
century by R. F. Holland ("The Miraculous," American Philosophical Quarterly, 2 
[1965], 43-51). 
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Relative Miracles, Accommodation, and Two-Fold Philosophy 
The evidence which we examined to this point is intended to show that 
the Newtonians rejected outright the standard seventeenth-century assump- 
tion that violations of the laws of nature can take place. However, if we set 
aside for the moment Clarke's "philosophical" definition of "miracle" 
(which a priori seems to rule out violations of the laws of nature), it might be 
argued that all we have established so far is that the Newtonians were 
skeptical about some accounts of miracles and that they reinterpreted these 
events accordingly, even going so far as to find alternative apologetic func- 
tions for them. It remains a possibility that they retained something like the 
standard conception of miracle, reserving it for very special occurrences. 
Indeed, a fair case could be made that while the Newtonians regarded the vast 
bulk of putative miracles as having occurred within the normal course of 
nature, a few dramatic events-the Creation, the miracles and resurrection of
Christ, and the approaching Eschaton-these things genuinely warranted the 
label "miracle" as used in the traditional sense. The Newtonians, according to 
this interpretation, were concerned to reduce dramatically the number of 
events which fell under the description "miracle" but were not committed to 
dispensing with the concept completely.6" This interpretation derives a mea- 
sure of support from the fact that Newton, Clarke, and Whiston do appear at 
times to concede that, during pivotal periods of history, genuine miracles had 
actually occurred. 
For example, Newton wrote to Burnet in 1680, speculating about the 
days of the Creation: "Where natural causes are at hand God uses them as 
instruments in his works, but I doe no think them alone sufficient for ye 
creation & therefore may be allowed to suppose that amongst other things 
God gave the earth it's motion by ... degrees."62 Whiston was similarly 
persuaded that God acted directly in the formation of the sublunary world, 
but thereafter rested: "The days of creation are signally distinguish'd from 
those following, in which God is said to have rested (when yet his ordinary 
Concurrence and the Course of nature was continued without Interruption) 
and must be reckon'd as such on which he truly exerted a Power different 
from the other."63 
A second period in which the Newtonians seem to allow genuine 
miracles was the apostolic age, when Jesus and his disciples wrought various 
wonders. Newton wrote to Locke in 1691-92 that "Miracles of good credit 
continued in the Church for about two or three hundred years."64 The more 
61 James Force, for example, writes that "Like Whiston,... Clarke ultimately commits 
himself, however reluctantly, to the possibility of miracles as transgressions of natural aw 
by a specially provident God" ("The Breakdown of the Newtonian Synthesis," 149). 
62 Newton to Burnet, January 1680/81, Correspondence of Isaac Newton, II, 334. 
63 Whiston, New Theory, 211. 
64 Newton to Locke, 16 February 1691/92 (Correspondence of Isaac Newton, III, 195). 
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outspoken Whiston wrote a complete work expressing the same point of 
view-that miracles began with Christ and ceased "just at, or after the 
second General Council, that of Constantinople."65 The waning of miracle- 
working had additional significance for the Newtonians. The denial of con- 
temporary miracles was an important component of anti-Catholic polemic. 
With the cessation of wonders all Romish miracles, and indeed all purported 
miracles enlisted in support of other revelations, could be discounted as 
impostures.66 Moreover, the withdrawal of the gift of miracle-working from 
the Church coincided with the ascendancy of Athanasian theology and its 
triumph over Arianism-the preferred trinitarian view of Newton, Whiston, 
and Clarke.67 For the Newtonians the cessation of miracles was thus in part a 
token of divine disapproval of what became the orthodox theological position 
with respect o the Trinity. 
Finally, the third "age of miracles," in which laws of nature would 
undergo an apparent change, was the Eschaton. Whiston observed that "The 
state of Nature during the Millenium will be very different from that at 
present."68 Newton himself had suggested, notoriously, that the present solar 
system would eventually grind to a halt, requiring the direct intervention of
God to reform it-a reformation which, incidentally, Newton most probably 
regarded as the destruction and renovation of the earth prophesied in Scrip- 
ture.69 
All of this seems to favor the view that in the final analysis Newton, 
Whiston, and Clarke were still committed to the traditional view that 
miracles, qua violations of the laws of nature, could take place, albeit not 
with the frequency claimed by their more enthusiastic advocates. These pas- 
sages, however, need not support the "ambiguity and inconsistency" hy- 
pothesis. The key to reconciling these admissions with what appears to be an 
outright rejection of miracles in other places is provided by an understanding 
of Clarke's motivation in providing two apparently contradictory definitions 
of "miracle." Clarke, we recall, stated that miracles in the "philosophical" 
sense, cannot be violations of the laws of nature (because there is no such 
thing as the course of nature), nor can they be singular interpositions of 
Divine power (because God's immediate power is constantly operating in the 
universe). Once Clarke's "philosophical" definition of miracle is accepted, 
no event, in principle, can be an objective miracle, including the signs and 
wonders recorded in the New Testament. At best there can be events which 
65 Whiston, Mr. W.'s Account of the Exact Time when Miraculous Gifts Ceas'd in the 
Church (London, 1749), 7. Cf. Whiston's A Collection of Authentic Records belonging to 
the Old and New Testament (London, 1727-28), 939-48, and An Account of the 
Daemoniacks (London, 1737), 59-73. 
66 Whiston, Ibid., 9-11. 
67 Whiston, Ibid. Also see Westfall, Never at Rest (Cambridge, 1980), 345. 
68 Whiston, New Theory, 214. 
69 Newton, Optics (New York, 19524), 402; David Kubrin, "Newton and the Cyclical 
Cosmos," JHI, 28 (1967) 325-46. 
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are miracles for us-miraculum quod nos, to use the phrase of Aquinas-in 
that we are, at some given point in time, unable to offer explanations of their 
causes. The reason Clarke also provides an apparently contradictory defini- 
tion of miracles which alludes to the interposition fGod is not on account of 
a failure of nerve on his part, but because of a commitment to notions of 
"accommodation" and the "two-fold philosophy." 
According to the principle of accommodation, God and his messengers 
had, throughout the course of history, "accommodated" divine revelations 
to the conceptions and mental capacities of the recipients of those revela- 
tions. Miracles, qua apparent interpositions into the natural order, are evi- 
dence of divine accommodation in that they have an immediate appeal to 
people of all capacities. Had Judeo-Christian religion been exclusively for 
those cognoscenti capable of grasping the truths of natural religion, along 
with a variety of intricate theological dogmas, miracles would have been 
unnecessary. However, for those of more modest intellect-the simple and 
the illiterate-miracles could provide a convincing demonstration f"super- 
natural" power. 
The appeal of miracles to those lacking intellectual gifts had already been 
noted by a number of theologians. Augustine had disparagingly remarked 
that miracles were not for the wise but for fools who were more inclined to 
rely upon their senses than their intellects.70 Twelve hundred years later 
Robert Boyle, while less dismissive of the miraculous, nevertheless pointed 
out that "Miracles are a proper way to appeal to men of all capacities; subtle 
arguments may convince philosophers, but Christianity is meant for all 
men. "71 Locke, too, had stressed that miracles must appeal to "all sorts and 
degrees of people," not least "the simple and illiterate," and that conse- 
quently it was their apparent contradiction of the normal course of nature 
which was crucial.72 Newton, Burnet, Whiston, and Clarke all assumed 
similarly that the vulgar throughout history either failed to comprehend the 
standing miracle evident in the natural course of things, or had simply lost 
their awe of the wonders of nature through familiarity. Miracles, in the sense 
of unusual events, were necessary for such people and indeed were a mark of 
God's accommodation of his message to the capacities of its intended 
recipients.73 
70 Augustine, De utilitate credendi, 16.34. 
71 Boyle, unpublished MS, "Some considerations about Miracles as they are Pleadable 
for the Christian Religion," quoted in R. M. Bums, The Great Debate, 53. 
72 Locke, Discourse of Miracles, Works, IX, 264. Cf. Fleetwood, Essay upon Miracles, 
78f.; Conyers Middleton, A Free Inquiry into the Miraculous Powers which are supposed 
to have subsisted in the Christian Church (London, 1749), xli. 
73 See, e.g., Newton to Burnet, January 1680/1 (Correspondence of Isaac Newton, II, 
331); Burnet to Newton, 13 January 1680/1 (Correspondence of Isaac Newton, II, 323). Cf. 
William Nicholls, A Conference with a Theist, Part IV (London, 1699), 238f; Abraham 
Lemoine, A Treatise on Miracles (London, 1747), 359. 
This content downloaded from 130.102.42.98 on Fri, 30 Oct 2015 01:34:15 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
548 Peter Harrison 
A further consequence of the principle of accommodation was that if the 
capacities of the human race had changed over time, God's methods of self- 
communication would alter accordingly. In an age of advancing science the 
need for miracles was far less, and not only because scientific explanations 
could be offered for events previously thought o be miraculous. For Newton 
and his peers the ordering of nature itself was sufficient testimony to the 
sovereignty of God; for the scientifically immature, unusual events per- 
formed the same function. As John Cockburn expressed the matter: 
Under the Patriarchal nd Jewish Oeconomy, God did reveal himself 
more frequently than now: The Jews had a succession of Prophets.... 
This Privilege is withdrawn ow, not because God careth less for the 
World, but because there is not such occasion for it now, as then: To 
omit other Reasons at this time, Men were then in a kind of Infant- 
state, they did not understand clearly either the Methods of Provi- 
dence, or God's Will and Purpose towards Mankind....74 
Improvements inknowledge, the most important of which was arguably was 
Newton's discovery of the law of universal gravitation, had not only made 
many miracles scientifically explicable, but had uncovered the miraculous 
nature of the everyday workings of the universe, making "miracles" super- 
fluous. The march of science had indeed nullified the concept, but fortu- 
itously had at the same time provided a more sophisticated alternative. 
It is important to note that while Clarke, Whiston, and Newton were all 
very conscious of the scientific progress made since the writing of the 
Pentateuch, they nonetheless realized that the seventeenth-century natural 
philosopher was only relatively better off than the rude Israelites to whom 
Moses had first expounded the history of the Creation. While the Newtonians 
insisted that in principle no event could be a true miracle, they could concede 
that certain remarkable events still evaded scientific explanation. It is for this 
reason that they use the familiar language of miracles for the Creation and the 
Eschaton. But as Clarke was at pains to point out to Leibniz, this usage 
requires careful analysis. The latter, as is well known, took exception to 
Newton's claim that the irregularities in the solar system, owing to the 
mutual attractions of the various bodies, "will be apt to increase, till this 
system wants a Reformation...."7s Leibniz objected that this reflected rather 
badly on the Creator, who must have lacked foresight in framing the laws of 
the universe.76 Clarke sprang to the defense of Newtonian science, explaining 
to Leibniz that "the word correction, or amendment, is to be understood, not 
with regard to God, but to us only." He continues: 
74 John Cockburn, Enquiry into the Nature, Necessity and Evidence of Christian Faith 
(London, 16992), 187. Cf. John Donne, Essayes in Divinity, 84; Alexander Calcott, A 
Treatise on the Deluge (London, 17682), 10; Conyers Middleton, Free Enquiry, cxii. 
7 Newton, Optics, 402. 
76 Leiibniz-Clarke Correspondence, 1. 
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The present frame of the solar system (for instance,) according to the 
present laws of motion, will in time fall into confusion; and perhaps, 
after that, will be amended or put into a new form. But this amend- 
ment is only relative, with regard to our conception. In reality, and 
with regard to God; the present frame, and the consequent disorder, 
and the following renovation, are all equally parts of the design 
framed in God's original perfect idea.77 
God interferes or interposes to reform the solar system but only with respect 
to our limited scientific onceptions-our present laws of motion as Clarke 
tellingly describes them. There will be nothing of the genuine miracle in the 
dissolution of our solar system, merely the operation of "natural" forces as 
yet not fully understood. All events, without exception, are part of "God's 
original perfect idea," and inasmuch as science, for the Newtonians at least, 
was directed at the discovery of these divine ideas, all events, without 
exception, fall under the purview of science. Whiston gave a similar account 
of the Eschaton: "this Catastrophe may naturally and regularly befal our 
Earth ... according to the true system of the World, and without a miracle."78 
Even the "miraculous" resurrection of human bodies which was to coincide 
with the end of the world was, in Whiston's view, "very agreeable to some 
known Phenomena of Nature."79 By implication, the references of Whiston 
and Newton to "direct" divine activity in the original Creation are to be 
similarly understood as "interventions" from our limited perspective only. 
Miracles thus have epistemological, and not ontological status. 
Clarke's dual definition is rendered even more explicable when we take 
into account the "two-fold philosophy," itself a fundamental ssumption of 
the principle of accommodation. Subscription to the two-fold philosophy 
was almost universal amongst the learned of the seventeenth century and 
involved the view that in science and religion, indeed in all spheres of 
learning, there are two forms of knowledge, one for the vulgar and one for the 
learned. It was more or less a synchronic version of the theory of accommo- 
dation, according to which there would be in every age, despite the advance 
of science, those who required a simple version of events. In the spirit of the 
two-fold philosophy Newton wrote of the philosophers of the past that they 
"loved so to mitigate their mystical discourses that in the presence of the 
vulgar they foolishly propounded vulgar matters for the sake of ridicule, and 
hid the truth behind discourses of this kind."80 As we have seen, Moses, too, 
practiced the two-fold philosophy, writing an "unfeigned" yet "unphilo- 
sophical" account of the Creation. Even the Fathers of the Church had 
succumbed to this tendency, propounding two versions of Christianity. "The 
77 Ibid., 22f. 
78 Whiston, Astronomical Principles of Religion, 153. 
79 Ibid., 152. 
80 Newton, Gregory MS. 247, fols. llf. Also see Frank E. Manuel, The Religion of 
Isaac Newton (Oxford, 1974), 39, 46. 
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multitude," averred Origen, "cannot comprehend the complex theology of 
the wisdom of God" and must settle for "the ipse dixit of Jesus.""8 Thus it 
was not without precedent hat the learned of the seventeenth century with- 
held their speculations on sensitive doctrinal matters from hoi polloi.82 
Thomas Bumet, for instance, felt at liberty to express his doubts about the 
eternity of hell in a Latin work but cautioned his reader that "whatever you 
decide in your own Breast of these Eternal Punishments, the people, too 
easily prone to Vice and easily terrified from Evil must have the commonly 
received Doctrine."83 Whiston characteristically admitted to a similarly lib- 
eral view of the torments of hell and even confided to his readers that both 
Clarke and Newton (neither of whom had seen fit to make public their 
opinions on this issue) shared his views.84 Newton, as is well known, also 
kept his Arian views private and even went so far as to prevent he admission 
of his friend Whiston into the Royal Society on account of Whiston's 
ingenuous admission of a commitment to that trinitarian heresy. Whiston's 
offence was clearly not his Arianism per se but the politically-fraught public 
profession of a heterodox creed. 
It is hardly surprising, given an intellectual culture of this kind, that 
Clarke would deem it necessary to at least give a nod in the direction of the 
"commonly received doctrine" concerning miracles, secure in the knowl- 
edge that it was a harmless way of looking at events which did have, 
subjectively at any rate, religious ignificance. To waver on this issue, in any 
case, would have been to play into the hands of the deistic proponents of 
natural religion, whose desire it was to do away with revelation altogether. 
The religious establishment would certainly have taken a dim view of any 
attempt o undermine its chief bulwark against deism-the argument from 
miracles. Thus, whereas in one sense the age of miracles was over, in another 
it was necessary for religious and political reasons to perpetuate the concept. 
For much the reason as Moses had propounded a non-philosophical ccount 
of the Creation, so the Newtonians reluctantly promoted a "theological" 
conception of the miraculous. The true position of Clarke, Whiston, and 
Newton is most expressly stated in the controversy with Leibniz (the argu- 
ments of which Newton personally supervised).85 In the more public Boyle 
81 Origen, Contra celsum, IV.9, 1.7; cf. De principiis, IV.ii.6-8; Basil, On the Spirit, 
XXVII.66. 
82 "Even still," wrote Whiston, "those who believe in the true System of the World, 
are forc'd among the Vulgar, and in common Conversation to speak as they do, and 
accommodate their expressions to the Notions and Apprehensions of the the generality of 
Mankind" (New Theory, 20). 
83 Burnet, Of the State of the Dead and Those that are to Rise, tr. M. Earberry (2 vols; 
London, 17282), II, 97. Bumet also indicated in the Latin original that he would take a dim 
view of any attempt o translate his work into the vernacular...a caution which Earberry 
blithely ignored. 
84 Whiston, The Eternity of Hell Torments Considered (London, 1740), lf. 
85 See Cambridge University Library, Add MS. 3965, fol. 289r, draft D, for evidence of 
Newton's editorial input into the publication of the Clarke-Leibniz correspondence. 
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lectures Clarke had to tread more warily-hence his inclusion of a "theologi- 
cal" definition of miracles which was somewhat at odds with the philosophi- 
cal account he had already outlined. 
None of this is to say, however, that Newton and his disciples embarked 
on a campaign of deliberate duplicity. Clarke, for instance, was privately 
aware that for even the most sophisticated philosophical thinker it was 
helpful at times to think of certain events as if they were interpositions on the 
part of the Deity. To call an event a "miracle" was to invest it with a special 
theological significance, and this was something which, for religious rea- 
sons, it was at times desirable to do. This view of the psychological necessity 
of retaining the more traditional use of "miracle" was shared by Whiston. In 
a vindication of his account of the causes of the Deluge. Whiston addressed 
those numerous critics who argued for the incompatibility ofmechanistic and 
miraculous explanations: "'Tis alledg'd against me, That my Mechanical 
Account of the Deluge implies it was no divine Judgement for the World's 
Wickedness; but from the Necessary Motion of the Comet and Earth, must 
have happen'd whether men had repented or not."86 Whiston responded that 
neither a scientific nor a moral account of the deluge are by themselves 
exhaustive explanations of the event. God in his prescience knew of the 
future sinful actions of men and so determined to punish them. The instru- 
ments of his judgment, however, were the natural causes which brought he 
deluge-inducing comet. It was true both that God punished a sinful human 
race by sending a flood and that the flood was inexorably brought on through 
the operation of secondary causes. In other words it was as if God had 
interposed. 
In an illuminating passage, Whiston goes on to explain that a comparable 
situation exists with respect to petitionary prayer. When we pray to God to 
bring about a future state of affairs, says Whiston, we must act as if God will 
literally intervene in the natural course of events-"it is best to suppose ... in 
our Devotions" that our prayers depend upon a "particular Interposition of 
Providence." In offering petitionary prayers we act as if our prayers will 
function in some way as causes of future contingent events. From a philo- 
sophical (as opposed to a devotional) perspective, however, we know that 
such a belief is highly problematic. The philosophical explanation of peti- 
tionary prayer is that God, knowing from the beginning of time what peti- 
tions will be offered, so arranges matters that those things we pray for occur 
in accordance with nature, and thus these events will inevitably take place, 
albeit in a rather special sense, "in response to" our prayers.87 This notwith- 
86 Whiston, A Vindication, 30. The critic was William Nicholls (see his Conference 
with a Theist, Part II [London, 1697], 207). 
87 We find similar solutions in Augustine De civitate dei, V.9, 10, and Aquinas Summa 
contra gentiles, III, 95. Cf. William Wollaston, "And thus the prayers, which good men 
offer to the All-knowing God, and the neglects of others, may find fitting effects already 
forecrafted in the course of nature" (The Religion of Nature Delineated [London, 1724], 
104). 
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standing, it is not unreasonable to maintain a distinction between a philosophi- 
cal and a devotional perspective on petitionary prayer. 
The same might be argued for miracles. Whiston concludes, although the 
argument is hard to disentangle from the prolix prose, that the two key 
notions of "the particular interposition of providence" and "miracle" 
amount to the same thing-as will become apparent, he assures us, when 
"the other parts of Nature yet to be discover'd, be found reducible to as fixt 
Laws as those we already know are."88 In other words we only speak of 
miracles and particular interpositions because we are ignorant of the fixed 
laws which account for such events, just as we remain ignorant of the laws 
governing the natural means by which prayer requests are granted. In short 
we are similarly placed to those who in previous ages, through a lack of 
knowledge of nature, attributed todivine interposition what we now know to 
have been natural. All miracles, then, are relative miracles. 
Conclusion 
The heroes of seventeenth-century science inhabited a thought-world 
very different from our own. However sophisticated their scientific visions of 
the universe, they often found themselves unable to jettison aspects of a past 
world, a world populated by occult forces, sympathies and antipathies, and 
the influences of supernatural beings. Men of the highest scientific reputation 
could still cling to the vestiges of medieval beliefs: witches, alchemy, 
astrology, and not least, miracles. From our contemporary perspective we are 
inclined to view many such beliefs, including the belief in miracles, as 
inimical to the scientific outlook. Accordingly, we tend to regard these men 
as having been faced with a stark choice: science or miracles but not both. It 
is because Newton and a number of his friends found themselves unable to 
make that choice that they stand charged with having embraced ambiguities 
and inconsistencies. I have argued that Newton, Whiston, and Clarke rejected 
this dichotomy and established a firm middle ground, allowing that those 
events traditionally labelled "miracles" had taken place, but denying that 
any philosophical sense could be made of the claim that they were breaches 
of natural aw. This new conception of the miraculous was most successfully 
applied by Newton's protege Whiston to the Deluge and the final Conflagra- 
tion. 
In an unpublished manuscript on the apocalypse Newton, speaking of the 
final restoration of the world, declared that nothing is "beyond the possibil- 
ity of nature, nothing too hard for the omnipotent power of God": the 
possibilities of nature, for Newton, were nothing less than the possibilities of 
88 Whiston, A Vindication, 31. Compare Bumet's response to the same criticism, An 
Answer to the Late Exceptions made by Mr Erasmus Warren against the Theory of the Earth 
(London, 1690), 17-19. 
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the omnipotent Deity.89 With such a conception of the ordering of the cosmos 
there could be no divine "violation of laws of nature." Newton did not, and 
could not, believe in miracles in this sense. Yet committed as he was to the 
omnipotence of God, Newton was open to the "strange and wonder- 
ful"-those prodigies which in past ages, and even in his own times, men 
had referred to as "miracles." 
Bond University. 
89 Yahuda MS. 9. 2, fol. 140r. Quoted in Manuel, Religion of Isaac Newton, 101. 
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